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Chip-based quantum key distribution
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Improvement in secure transmission of information is an urgent need for governments,
corporations and individuals. Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises security based on
the laws of physics and has rapidly grown from proof-of-concept to robust demonstrations
and deployment of commercial systems. Despite these advances, QKD has not been widely
adopted, and large-scale deployment will likely require chip-based devices for improved
performance, miniaturization and enhanced functionality. Here we report low error rate,
GHz clocked QKD operation of an indium phosphide transmitter chip and a silicon oxynitride
receiver chip—monolithically integrated devices using components and manufacturing
processes from the telecommunications industry. We use the reconfigurability of these
devices to demonstrate three prominent QKD protocols—BB84, Coherent One Way and
Differential Phase Shift—with performance comparable to state-of-the-art. These devices,
when combined with integrated single photon detectors, pave the way for successfully
integrating QKD into future telecommunications networks.
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M
any of our conventional cryptographic schemes
are based on the assumption of an adversary’s
computational power. In comparison, quantum key
distribution (QKD) establishes cryptographic keys by transmit-
ting single photons across a quantum channel, with its security
based on the physical laws of quantum mechanics1,2. Over the
last few decades, QKD has developed from simple
demonstrations to robust implementations3–6, and is one of the
first commercial quantum technologies7,8. Despite this maturity,
QKD has seen limited adoption. Practical, large-scale deployment
likely requires the use of integrated photonic devices providing
enhanced functionality and miniaturization, in a platform
amenable to mass-manufacture and easy integration with
existing and emerging classical integrated telecommunications
infrastructure.
While extreme levels of integration have been achieved in
the microelectronics industry over the past decades, it is only
recently that size, cost and power consumption considerations
have demanded higher levels of integration in photonics.
Fibre-to-the-home, data centre and 100Gbps metro and
long-haul network applications have driven the development of
the indium phosphide (InP) platform to the point of
full integration of laser sources, amplifiers, modulators and
detectors9. Integrated photonics10 is thus poised to deliver
major benefits to QKD technology and networks11–13 by
allowing the miniaturization of components and circuits
for hand-held and field deployable devices. It also provides
highly robust manufacturing processes, which help reduce
cost for personal devices. Finally, the complexity achievable
with the integrated platform enables practical impleme-
ntation of multi-protocol operation for flexibility, multiplexing
for higher rates and additional monitoring and certifi-
cation circuits to protect against side-channel attacks1 in a fibre
network.
While there have been individual demonstrations of time-bin
decoding14, miniaturization15 and reconfigurability4 in integrated
devices, here we report QKD operation of complex devices
that will allow the use of quantum secured communications in
the applications described above. We use the InP platform
to implement a monolithically integrated transmitter (Fig. 1a),
consisting of a tunable laser, optical interferometers, electro-optic
phase modulators (EOPM) and a p-i-n photodiode. We
implement a receiver (Fig. 1b), consisting of a photonic circuit
with thermo-optic phase shifters (TOPS) and reconfigurable
delay line in the silicon oxynitride (SiOxNy) platform and off-chip
single photon detectors. Both photonic systems are manufactured
using state-of-the-art industrial fabrication processes and are
designed for multi-protocol reconfigurable operation, here we
demonstrate three important QKD protocols: BB84 (ref. 16),
coherent one way (COW)17 and differential phase shift (DPS)18.
We show performance of the photonic devices with clock rates
up to 1.7GHz, a quantum bit error rate (QBER) as low as
0.88% and estimated secret key rates up to 568 kbps, for an
emulated 20 km fibre link. These devices are manufactured using
the same fabrication processes as classical communications
technology and microelectronics. Together with the develop-
ment of integrated single photon detectors19–21, they point the
way to seamless integration with existing and emerging classical
communication systems.
Results
Integrated photonic devices. Figure 1 shows a schematic of the
chip-to-chip QKD system. For the transmitter device, the
InP material system was chosen to meet the requirements of
fast active electro-optics (with GHz operating speeds) and
monolithic integration with the laser source. For the receiver
device, the SiOxNy material system was chosen to minimize
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Figure 1 | Integrated photonic devices for quantum key distribution. (a) A 26mm2 integrated indium phosphide (InP) transmitter for GHz clock rate,
reconfigurable, multi-protocol QKD. The circuit combines a continuous tunable laser diode (LASER), EOPMs, photodiode and interferometers formed by
multi-mode interference (MMI) devices acting as 50:50 beamsplitters. This allows for pulse modulation (P.MOD), phase randomization (PH.RAND),
intensity modulator (I.M) and phase encoding (PH.ENC). (b) A 2 32mm2 silicon oxynitride (SiOxNy) photonic receiver circuit for reconfigurable,
multi-protocol QKD that passively decodes the quantum information with off-chip single photon detectors (SPDs). MZIs are formed by directional couplers
(DC), and configured with thermo-optic phase shifters (TOPS). This allows for a tunable beamsplitter, and a phase decoding (PH.DEC) circuit, which
includes loss balancing (L-BAL) and a tunable delay (T-DEL). (c) The InP technology platform waveguide cross-section9 with the deep etch waveguide
having 1 mm width and 4mm etch depth. (d) Wavelength tunable continuous wave laser, formed from two tunable distributed Bragg reflectors (T-DBR) and
a semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA) totalling 1.1mm in length. (e) Microscopic image of EOPM in a MZI formed by two multi-mode interference
devices acting as 50:50 beamsplitters. Scale bar, 500mm. (f) The SiOxNy Triplex waveguide cross-section, with metalisation for heating elements22 with a
B2 mm waveguide width. (g) Microscopic image of the receiver delay lines. Scale bar, 1mm.
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photon loss from fibre-to-chip coupling and waveguide
propagation loss, while maintaining a compact footprint.
Both devices, along with fibre coupled single photon detectors,
represent the full photonic QKD system.
Transmitter. The InP-based transmitter chip was fabricated
using an advanced active-passive integration technology9, where
a multistep epitaxial growth process provides large flexibility
in the waveguide structure (see Fig. 1c). The on-chip tunable laser
(Fig. 1d) was formed from two distributed Bragg reflectors (DBR)
and a semiconductor optical amplifier (SOA). When operated in
continuous wave (CW) the laser source exhibited single mode
behaviour with a coherence time 41.5 ns, a side-mode
suppression ratio of 450 dB and an operating wavelength of
1,550 nm with B10 nm tuning range. Short electrical pulses
applied to the reverse biased EOPM in the first Mach–Zehnder
interferometer (MZI) enabled optical pulse generation with
o150 ps duration and B30 dB extinction ratio. The exact
timing between consecutive pulses could be accurately
controlled by the driving electronics (see Supplementary
Methods), and the on-chip photodiode was used to monitor the
laser intensity and provide feedback to stabilize the laser current.
The remaining EOPMs and MZIs were used to drive the different
QKD protocols and to attenuate the laser pulses to the single
photon level. Light was coupled out of the device using
a lensed optical fibre, with the photon intensity levels calibrated
at the output of this fibre.
Receiver. The SiOxNy receiver chip was fabricated using
the TripleX technology platform22, where alternating layers of
Si3N4 and SiO2 were deposited and etched to create a waveguide
structure to guide light in a high index-contrast but low loss
waveguides (B0.5 dB/cm), and with low coupling loss between
chip and fibre (B2 dB), yielding a total loss B9 dB for
BB84 configuration. While lower losses for integrated receivers
using silica planar lightwave circuits have been reported14, our
high index-contrast and small-footprint circuits allow for more
complexity. This includes multi-protocol operation and multiple
time-bin selection, but adds to the device loss.
Metal layers on top of the structure created TOPS for circuit
reconfigurability. The first MZI acts as a tunable beamsplitter
and taps off a portion of the incoming signal, which was routed
to a single photon detector and used primarily for the
COW protocol. The second MZI (L-BAL) acts to balance the
losses in the asymmetric MZI (AMZI), which incorporates a
digitally reconfigurable delay line, tunable from 0 to 2.1 ns in
steps of 300 ps. This structure (PH.DEC) permits the interfero-
metric measurement between the transmitter and receiver, and
the TOPS within the AMZI was used to calibrate the phase
relationship between the two arms of the interferometer. Light
was coupled out of the device and into external fibre coupled
superconducting nanowire single photon detectors mounted
in a closed cycle refrigerator23 which had a system detection
efficiency of B45% from the fibre input, a temporal jitter of
B50 ps, average dark count rate of B500 cps, and a dead-time
of B10 ns.
The highly reconfigurable nature of the transmitter
and receiver devices allowed the implementation of a number
of different QKD protocols. Here, we specifically investigated the
three prominent protocols of BB84, COW and DPS. With
these three protocols we demonstrate a number of key
functionalities required for the transmission and reception of
weak-coherent-based quantum key distribution. This includes
high extinction ratio pulse modulation (periodic in DPS and
non-periodic in COW), phase encoding (in DPS), phase
randomization (for BB84), and intensity modulation
(required for decoy states24). The commonalities of the receiver
circuits include a combination of direct temporal measurements
and phase interference, allowing for a reconfigurable generic
design to accommodate the different transmission protocols.
In each case, we have highlighted the specific security framework
used for the analysis of the achieved secret key rates and
compared to other key experiments in the literature.
Protocols. The BB84 (ref. 16) QKD protocol was implemented
using time-bin encoding, where |0i was encoded by a photon in
the first time-bin and |1i was encoded by a photon in the second
time-bin, while |þi was encoded by a photon in a superposition
of the first and second time-bin with zero relative phase, and |i
was encoded by a photon in a superposition of being in the first
and second time-bin with a p relative phase, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. The BB84 protocol transmits one of two orthogonal states
chosen at random, encoded in one of two randomly chosen non-
orthogonal bases. We used the Z-basis {|0i, |1i} and the X-basis
{|þi, |i}.
The CW laser source was modulated (P.MOD) to select
the time-bin choice, which was then phase randomised with a
single electro-optic modulator (PH.RAND) before being attenu-
ated and intensity modulated. The intensity of the {|þi, |i}
states was reduced by half, compared to the {|0i, |1i} states in
order to maintain the same average photon number per state.
The intensity modulator was also used to prepare one of three
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−30
−20
−10
0
Ph
ot
on
 fl
ux
 (d
B) |0 〉
E.R. ~ 29 dB
−30
−20
−10
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−30
−20
−10
0
Ph
ot
on
 fl
ux
 (d
B)
0
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
−30
−20
−10
0
Ph
ot
on
 fl
ux
 (d
B)
Ph
ot
on
 fl
ux
 (d
B)
Time (ns)
FWHM ~ 136 ps|1〉
|+〉
|–〉
 = 580 ps
Figure 2 | Transmitter output for the BB84 states. Single photon
histogram measurements demonstrating the 136 ps full-width-half-
maximum (FWHM) pulses with near 30 dB extinction. The two time-bins
have a temporal separation of 580 ps, with a 0 or p relative phase
difference for the |þi and |i states, respectively.
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intensity levels at random to encode the ‘decoy’ photon
levels required for the security presented by Ma et al.24.
The final MZI encoded the relative phase between successive
time-bins to implement the |i state.
Within the receiver chip, the digitally tunable delay line
was reconfigured to match the 600 ps time interval between time-
bins from the transmitter device. The phase decoding
AMZI overlapped successive time-bins creating three possible
time-slots within which to detect photons. Phase information
interfered in the middle time-slot allowing measurements in
the {|þi, |i} basis, whereas time of arrival information in
the first and third time-slots measured in the {|0i, |1i} basis.
The COW protocol17 transmits pulses in pairs, encoding
|0i with the first bin and |1i with the second. Again the pulse
modulated CW laser was used to generate pulses in these
time-bins. While the key was generated unambiguously from the
time of arrival of the single photon in a pair, security of
the channel was determined by measuring the visibility from
interfering successive photon pulses. A decoy state, with photon
pulses in each time-bin (|0i and |1i), was included to increase
the probability of occupied successive pulses, allowing a
more accurate measurement of interference, and to detect
photon-number-splitting attacks. Using the first MZI, the
receiver routes a larger proportion of the input signal to single
photon detectors for key generation, and a smaller proportion to
the AMZI for visibility measurement.
Finally, the DPS protocol18 encodes information within
the relative phase, 0 and p, of a train of photon pulses
generated from the temporally modulated CW laser. The
information was decoded unambiguously through the AMZI
by interfering successive pulses, providing a QBER based on
the number of incorrect counts at the wrong output of the
phase decoding circuit. The security of the channel was
determined by bounding the possible information an adversary
could extract, that in turn would cause errors in the transmitted
information.
Rates. Each of the above three protocols were implemented
on the chip-to-chip system, where the length of optical fibre
link was emulated using a variable optical attenuator to induce
channel loss. This was sufficient to demonstrate the dominant
error mechanisms as the effects of dispersion are negligible for
the broad B150 ps pulses used over these distances. A loss of
0.2 dB/km was assumed (standard within telecommunications
fibres at 1,550 nm), although rates could be improved through
use of low loss fibres25, and by optimizing the superconducting
nanowire single photon detectors for ultra low dark counts26.
Small fluctuations in the average count rates in Fig. 3 are due
to slight variations in fibre-to-chip coupling efficiencies
and would be reduced using standard v-groove fibre
array packaging techniques, which should also provide facet
coupling on the receiver ofo1 dB. The emulated fibre distance in
Fig. 3 represents the fibre length between the two systems, where
each system includes the fibre-to-chip coupling loss of the
packaged integrated device. This directly informs what can be
expected once deployed in a real network.
The performance of our integrated devices for all three
protocols is shown in Fig. 3, where the raw key rate, estimated
asymptotic secret key rate, and QBER observed are plotted.
For BB84, using an attenuation equal to 20 km of fibre
we obtained an estimated secret key rate of 345 kbps using
a clock rate of 560MHz; using mean photon number pulses
of 0.45, 0.1, and 5.0 10 4 for the signal and two decoy
states chosen with probabilities of 0.8, 0.15, and 0.05 respectively;
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Figure 3 | Experimental results. (a) BB84, (b) COWand (c) DPS showing the raw detection rate, estimated asymptotic secret key rate and relevant QBER.
For BB84, the QBER is derived from the timing and phase errors, while for COW the QBER is derived from the timing error and security of the channel is
estimated from phase coherence between successive pulses, and finally for DPS the QBER is estimated based on the error from the phase encoded
information. State (or clock) rates of 560MHz, 860MHz and 1.76GHz were used for BB84, COW and DPS, respectively.
Table 1 | Comparison of parameters and measured rates for three QKD protocols.
Protocol l (per pulse) State rate (GHz) QBER time (%) QBER phase (%) Key rate (kbps) Attack security Key analysis
BB84 0.45 0.56 1.17±0.18 0.92±0.11 345±15 General Asymptotic
COW 0.28 0.86 1.37±0.15 1.36±0.16 311±50 Collective* Asymptotic
DPS 0.28 1.72 N/A 0.88±0.10 565±89 Collective* Asymptotic
BB84 (ref. 34) 0.42 B1 QX,Z B{3.6, 4.3} 4,390 Collective Finite
COW25 0.06 0.63 2.4 0.85 248 Collective* Finite
DPS35 0.19 2.0 N/A 1.89 733 Individual Asymptotic
Over an emulated fibre link of 20 km, assuming 0.2 dB/km, using a digital variable attenuator. Further example parameters for 20 km (4dB) links for biased-basis BB84 (1.09Mbps at 50 km)34,
COW (12.7 kbps at 16.9 dB)25 and DPS (1.16Mbps at 10 km)35 included for comparison. These values were either provided directly in the references or estimated/interpolated from the accessible data,
and QX,Z refers to the two basis QBERs, which were not directly comparable to the time and phase QBERs demonstrated in this work.
*Indicates results based on the upper bound proofs of Branciard et al.27.
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and observed an average QBER of 1.05%. The lower bound
secret key rate for BB84 against general attacks was calculated
using the raw and sifted key rates, and the measured QBER,
using the security proof of Ma et al.24.
For COW, again using an attenuation equal to 20 km of
fibre we obtained an estimated secret key rate of 311 kbps using a
clock rate of 0.86GHz with a QBER of 1.37% due to timing
information and a QBER of 1.36% due to the interferometer
and security of the channel. The secret key rate of COW was
calculated using the sifted key rate and measured visibilities
according to the security proof by Branciard et al.27 shown to be
an upper bound for collective attacks. In order to use
such security analysis, we additionally assume that the
visibilities from any case of successively occupied pulses are all
equal to the average value visibility measured across all
cases. Finally, DPS at the same attenuation obtained an
estimated secret key rate of 565 kbps using a clock rate of
1.72GHz and measuring a QBER of 0.88%. The secret key rate
of DPS was calculated by measuring the key errors and visibilities
according to the upper bound security proof by Branciard et al.27
and is limited to collective attacks.
Discussion
A summary of these results are presented in Table 1, where in all
cases we show a performance comparable to the state-of-the-art
in current fibre and bulk optical systems1. This work
demonstrates the feasibility of using fully integrated devices
within QKD systems, implementing three prominent protocols
by utilizing the reconfigurability of the devices. The integrated
photonic platform allowed us to demonstrate miniaturized
devices exploiting robust, low-cost manufacturing processes,
that allow flexibility in fibre network settings.
We have demonstrated key functionalities required for
weak-coherent-based quantum key distribution, and these devices
could be readily adapted to implement more protocols, such as
the reference-frame independent28, SARG29 and B92 (ref. 30).
Also the tunablity of the laser source enables flexibility in the
wavelength of operation, this combined with the complexity
achievable with the platform will be key to enabling high capacity
wavelength division multiplexing schemes of the quantum
channel in a practical implementation. Future demonstrations
will require focus on the complete system for autonomous QKD
operation, including the development of appropriate error
reconciliation, privacy amplification and the use of finite-key
analysis to qualify the security.
The increased complexity allowed by integrated photonics
will facilitate the implementation of further monitoring and
certification circuits, protecting against security flaws and side-
channel attacks1 with minimal change in footprint and cost. For
example the BB84 decoding used here allowed for a passive
optical circuit, with the detection event constituting the random
basis choice, thus removing the requirement for GHz rate active
elements and quantum random number generators in the
receiver. While this has been a common detection scheme in
many different experiments, it can potentially open a security
loophole, which can be mitigated with active basis selection31.
Detector vulnerabilities32 could also be satisfied by operating the
integrated devices for measurement-device independent QKD33.
Compatibility with current integrated photonic telecommuni-
cation hardware will ultimately allow seamless operation
alongside classical communications transceivers, enabling hybrid
classical and quantum communications devices. Moreover,
the ability to scale up these integrated circuits to hundreds or
even thousands of components9 opens the way to new and
advanced integrated quantum communications technologies.
Data availability
The data that support the findings of this study are available from
the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
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